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In 2001, the National Library published a collection of essays, David Malouf: A Celebration. 
It contained tributes from friends and colleagues who knew Malouf well, and who inhabited a 
familiar world of literary culture. Readers of Malouf’s fiction and poetry share in that 
familiarity; his close observation of the details of place and of inner life draws them into this 
circle. Introducing the collection, Ivor Indyk observed that Malouf’s ‘public reputation rests 
on the most private grounds of all, the achievement of intimacy’ (Indyk 1). This year, a 
selection of Malouf’s public writing about Australian life has been published as A First Place. 
Its ‘Author’s Note’ differentiates works of the imagination from writings that belong to ‘the 
world of . . . analysis, and open opinion and discourse.’ Though they have different purposes, 
and come from different sources, Malouf suggests, both ‘are shaped by the same temperament 
and come to the reader in something like the same voice’ (Malouf, Place x). The familiar, 
conversational voice that his readers recognise also underwrites his cultural authority in the 
wider public realm.  
 
This essay describes Malouf’s engagement with the public conversation and his emergence as 
a trusted commentator on contemporary life. His Boyer lectures made a case for the value of 
civility and the place of literature and theatre as important institutions in civil society. His 
public writing and broadcasting also demonstrate an understanding of the critical role that 
emotion plays in public debate. Commenting on ‘The People’s Judgement’ in the failed 
referendum on an Australian republic, he observes: ‘We live in feelings as well as conditions 
and events’ (Malouf, Place 230). The discussion which follows draws on recent explorations 
of civility and trust, fragile ideals that have been revived and scrutinised as part of a new 
interest in civil society, and on work that highlights how emotion as well as reason shapes the 
public realm. There is now a growing literature on this subject, but this account of Malouf’s 
presence in the world of ‘open opinion and discourse’ takes up the work of cultural historian 
Stefan Collini, philosopher of politics and art Mark Kingwell, and psychoanalyst and literary 
critic Adam Phillips, which describes the contours of an ever diversifying public realm where 
contending voices and interests struggle to be heard. 
 
Though Malouf claims that imaginative works ‘have nothing to do with the world of opinion’ 
and that their public life is ‘in the hands of readers’ (Malouf, Place ix), questions of voice and 
rhetoric are at the heart of Ransom (2009). This meditation on war and mortality makes use of 
the conventions of lament, and also reflects on the uses of speech in a ‘prattling world’ 
(Malouf, Ransom 126). Setting out to redeem Hector’s body, Priam recalls how the power of 
speech has figured in his personal history. As Podarces, son of a vanquished king, he had 
cowered among the ‘rabble of slave children,’ knowing that his cultivated voice would betray 
him (Malouf, Ransom 68). Ransomed and renamed Priam, in time he took his father’s place. 
Then, silence confirmed his power: his herald became his mouthpiece. Now, Priam 
understands that to honour his son, he must find a new voice for his appeal. When he goes to 
meet Achilles, he leaves the herald behind. Idaeus’s place is taken by the carter Somax, whose 
mouth is unstoppable: 
 
What he had to say, if you regarded it strictly, was unnecessary. It had no point 
or use. The wonder, given this, was that it did so little harm—none at all in 
fact—to the fellow’s dignity. There was something here, Priam thought, that he 
needed to think about. (Malouf, Ransom 125-26) 
 
The carter talks to be sociable; the point is to confirm his membership of a community. 
Through his chatter, he reveals himself and his sorrow at the loss of his own son, and the ways 
of his world. Waiting for darkness to fall before they approach the Greek stockade, Priam 
realises that the no man’s land outside the city walls is a wild, humming, rustling place, where 
‘each thing’s presence was as much the sound it made as its shape’ (Malouf, Ransom 127). 
Here the grieving king considers how he will bring ‘something new’ into being, how he will 
cut the knots of convention and hostility in his appeal to Achilles. His demeanour, gesture and 
speech will be critical to bridging the gulf between them. To succeed, he must change them 
both. Achilles will be freed from ‘. . . the obligation of being always the hero, as I am 
expected always to be the king. To take on the lighter bond of being simply a man. Perhaps 
that is the real gift I have to bring him. Perhaps that is the ransom’ (Malouf, Ransom 59-60). 
Thus Ransom gives its readers something to think about: present conflicts as well as ancient 
ones; our own prattling world, where power is mediated through spin; and the way that 
feeling, as well as reason, permeates exchanges in the public realm.  
 
Having established his literary reputation, Malouf now has a presence in the world of analysis 
and opinion as a ‘commentator on Australian values’ (Indyk 1) which was confirmed by the 
invitation to deliver the Boyer lectures in 1998. The pieces now collected in A First Place 
show how his distinct perspective has been shaped by a wartime childhood in Brisbane, by 
growing up in a family with diverse linguistic, cultural and religious affiliations, and by a 
Queensland state school education in the 1940s. In ‘Made in England,’ that autobiography 
intersects with Australia’s changing place in the world and an evolving sense of what 
Australia is or could become: 
 
This venture we call ‘Australia’ was always an experiment. It has taken us a 
long time to see it in this light, and even longer to accept the lightness, the 
freedom, the possibility that offers as a way of being. It keeps us on our toes, as 
curious observers of ourself. . . . It ought to make us sceptical of conclusions, of 
any belief that where we are now is more than a moment on the way. (Malouf, 
Place 332-333) 
 
Stefan Collini has observed that ‘cultures, like individuals, can become imprisoned in images 
of themselves, lulled by the sheer repetition of a few pat phrases into believing that they have 
identified their distinctive nature’ (Collini 2-3). For Collini, the duty of the public intellectual 
is to use their cultural capital to extend the social imaginary and to counteract the 
complacency of ‘pat phrases.’ While Malouf’s fiction and poetry has vividly refracted aspects 
of our ‘distinctive nature,’ his public writing urges us to be ‘sceptical of conclusions.’ In his 
measured and sometimes playful voice, Malouf encourages us to be generous and just rather 
than harshly judgmental. While he continues to be an advocate for Australian artists and 
writers, he also speaks and writes about the ideas underpinning our cultural and social life—
ideas of belonging, freedom and equality, reaching out to what Collini calls ‘true publics.’ 
 
In the Boyer lectures, A Spirit of Play, Malouf’s imaginative engagement with cultural 
objects—plays, poems, landscapes, architecture—and with everyday life, illustrates how its 
citizens have created a community and responded to Australia’s ‘complex fate’ as a nation. He 
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describes the shifting worlds of feeling in which an Australian consciousness and sense of 
belonging have come into being. More than a decade later, The Happy Life (2011) offers a 
wide-ranging discussion of the pursuit of happiness and personal freedom in the contemporary 
world. In the broadcast lectures, Malouf’s democratic voice addresses its listeners as 
neighbours, whose tolerance of diversity rests on 
 
The capacity to make a distinction between what belongs, in the way of loyalty, 
to clan or sect or family, and what to the demands of neighbourliness; what 
belongs to our individual and personal lives and what we owe to res publica or 
Commonwealth, the life we share with others, even those who may differ from 
us in the most fundamental way. . . . It is the capacity to make and honour these 
distinctions, out of a common concern for the right we have, each one of us, to 
pursue our own interests, that is essential to the life of cities, and beyond that, to 
their more precarious extension as states. (Malouf, Place 222-223) 
 
Writing in the context of Canadian multiculturalism, Mark Kingwell argues that the ‘civil 
tongue’ is characterised by a familiarity that nevertheless preserves distance and privacy. 
Civility is more than mere politeness, though politeness can make social interaction easier. 
The civility necessary to the negotiation of differences in the social and political realm is the 
product of an expansive ethical imagination that engages with the past and with the demands 
of contemporary pluralism. This imagination is at work in Malouf’s lectures, and just as 
Kingwell is concerned to register the sounds and cadences of civil speech, so too Malouf is 
sensitive to the significance of ‘tone’: ‘There is something to be said for mildness. It leaves 
people the breathing space, and the energy, to get on with more important things’ (Malouf, 
Place 223). 
 
‘Important things,’ such as ideas about privacy and personal freedom, about community, exit 
and belonging, about the value of culture, are too often talked about in uncivil tongues. 
Malouf’s tolerance might seem to have unlikely origins in Queensland, a place often 
caricatured as ‘red-necked’ and parochial. In ‘A first place,’ the 1984 Herbert Blaiklock 
Memorial Lecture that gives the recent volume its title, Malouf describes the influence of 
topography on attitudes and dispositions. Growing up in Brisbane, whose hilly streets offer 
changing views of the horizon, and whose houses order space up and under, inside and out, 
produced his awareness that habits of mind are anchored in the body and in its dwelling 
places. It takes effort to climb Brisbane’s hills; cresting them, the eye moves restlessly across 
the unfolding horizon. This experience encourages ‘a kind of intellectual play, a delight in 
new and shifting views’ (Malouf, Place 5-6). Open, ‘unsealable’ houses foster an awareness 
of other bodies: 
 
You learn in such houses to listen. . . . You also learn what not to hear, what is 
not-to-be-heard; because it is a condition of such houses that everything can be 
heard. Strict conventions exist about what should be listened to and these soon 
become habits of not-listening, not-hearing. So too, habits grow up of not-
seeing. (Malouf, Place 10) 
 
Kerryn Goldsworthy, commenting on this essay, says that this knowledge of place ‘from the 
body outwards’ is an accretion of bodily memory, a knowledge more vivid than knowledge 
gleaned from documents or maps (Goldsworthy 7-8). The body is the foundation of Malouf’s 
thinking, feeling and judging, capacities that he identifies as essential to citizenship in his 
Boyer lectures.  
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Their subject is ‘the making of Australian consciousness.’ The shape and focus of Malouf’s 
discussion recalls Henry James’s comment in a letter to Charles Eliot Norton in 1872: ‘It’s a 
complex fate, being an American, & one of the responsibilities it entails is fighting against a 
superstitious valuation of Europe’ (Gorra 33). Malouf’s account of how ‘we latecomers,’ who 
arrived as convicts, migrants and refugees, have confronted ‘a complex fate’ also calls ‘a 
superstitious valuation of Europe’ into question. The lectures map a history of how migrant 
feelings of insecurity and adventurousness have played out, a history framed by two vignettes 
that illustrate his contention that Australian consciousness is marked by a ‘spirit of play’—
inventiveness and delight in the imagination.  
 
The first lecture recalls a dramatic entertainment got up by convicts aboard one of the ships in 
the first fleet, the ‘Scarborough’: 
 
So, smuggled in on one of those eleven little ships, along with their cargo of 
criminal rejects, and all the necessary objects for settling a new place . . . was 
this spirit of make-believe, of theatre, of play. And along with it, an audience’s 
delight, and practiced skill no doubt, in watching and listening. (Malouf, Place 
136-37) 
 
The English culture of the late Enlightenment was carried here in methods of farming, ideas 
about authority and industry, and experiments in reform. Convicts’ craft skills were used in 
the construction of public buildings, among them a playhouse, established in 1796. In April 
1800, Henry IV Part 1 was staged, a play about rebellion that ‘must have had a special appeal, 
a special relevance for this audience.’ It was a dangerous play in such a place, and not 
surprisingly, the theatre was soon closed (Malouf, Place 141-42).  
 
Malouf returns to that early theatre in his final lecture, ‘A Spirit of Play.’ There he links the 
exuberance and mockery of Shakespeare’s characters with the contemporary carnival of the 
Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras. He sees in these performances examples of the 
freedoms that underpin democratic societies, a connection that has been elaborated by the 
sociologist Richard Sennett in his classic book, The Fall of Public Man. The single occasion 
of a performance enables people to recognise themselves as a single entity, to realise that unity 
is possible: 
 
An audience comes together of its own volition, unlike a rally for example, 
where there is always some element of compulsion, if only a moral one of 
commitment or duty. . . . They have no reason for being there other than interest, 
curiosity, pleasure, and they are an audience, not simply a crowd; an audience 
that has been created and shaped by the society it is drawn from, and in which 
the faculty of watching, listening and judging has been to an extraordinary 
degree sharpened . . . . 
 
As for the actors in this street theatre—could anyone have guessed, back then, 
that it would be just this group that would call a popular audience into being? 
(Malouf, Place 225-26) 
 
It is not conflict or war that has created this successful, tolerant community, Malouf argues, 
but carnival: ‘It recovers for us, within the complexities and the divisiveness of modern living, 
a sense of wholeness’ (Malouf, Place 228). Carnival embodies the ‘spirit of play,’ dispelling 
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stifling conformity, and offering a space for the marginal, the vulgar and the vernacular to be 
heard and seen. 
 
Australia has emerged from a past marked by sectarianism and suspicion of strangers—the 
past of Malouf’s youth in the 40s and 50s—to become a more open, cosmopolitan place. He 
sees the evidence of that change in a new, easy acceptance of the body: 
 
. . . consider how far these ordinary Australians have come from that old distrust 
of the body and its pleasures that might have seemed bred in the bone in the 
Australians we were even thirty years ago.  
 
These people have changed, not just their minds but their psyches, and have 
discovered, along the way, a new body. They have slipped so quickly and so 
easily into this other style of being that they might have been living this way, 
deep in a tradition of physical ease, a comfortable accommodation between body 
and soul, for as long as grapes have grown on vines or olives on trees. (Malouf, 
Place 217) 
 
That change had been under way since the time of Malouf’s boyhood, when the beach and 
the public baths emerged as congregant spaces. 
 
The new visibility of bodies in public space and our diverse ways of inhabiting them are 
central to Malouf’s ideas about ‘the happy life,’ a topic that has been much discussed in 
recent times. The Happy Life is a more ambitious and risky foray into the ‘world of open 
opinion and discourse’, first published in the Quarterly Essay series in 2011. The Quarterly 
Essay format was conceived as way of stimulating debate on public issues, as each essay was 
accompanied by a range of critical responses. That format was preserved when Malouf’s 
essay was reissued in 2012. In keeping with Collini’s notion of a ‘true public’, Robert Dessaix 
is the only respondent from the familiar world of literary culture.  
 
In the essay, Malouf sets out to pin down a notoriously elusive idea in a conventional way, 
calling on the aid of classical sources, Enlightenment philosophy and the work of writers and 
artists to examine two dimensions of happiness, the hedonic and the eudemonic—joy and 
contentment. Joy is a euphoric, uplifting experience that does not last. Contentment is a more 
settled state, difficult to achieve and to sustain. It is linked to human flourishing, to creativity 
and a sense of completeness.  
 
Pleasure can be experienced even in dire circumstances. Malouf goes to Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s gulag to find an example. He might instead have turned to his own work to 
illustrate the stoicism he finds so admirable—to Jim Saddler who, during a brief respite from 
battle, anticipates the pleasures of bread, butter and the ‘thick, golden-green sweetness’ of 
melon and lemon jam in the very moment that his mate Clancy, some ten yards off, is blown 
to smithereens (Malouf, Fly Away 82). As it was, his choice dismayed one of his respondents, 
Robert Lagerberg, a Russian specialist from Melbourne University. Lagerberg objects that 
Malouf’s reading of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, a book that was widely read in 
the 1960s and after Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974, is ‘simplistic’ 
and that it ignores the politics that produced the gulags (Malouf, Happy Life 110). Malouf’s 
point is that there is something in humans that finds ways to transcend even the most awful 
circumstances. This does not mean that injustice, cruelty and suffering should be ignored. 
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Rather, resilience in the face of suffering reinforces the notion of dignity that underpins 
claims of natural rights. 
 
Contentment is a more elusive goal. Pondering whether a human nature disposed to 
restlessness, and perhaps always already lacking, can achieve this end, Malouf recalls Plato’s 
account of the creation in Protagoras, where Zeus delegates the business of differentiating 
species to Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus. Regrettably, after these two have 
distributed the attributes that will protect each creature and allow its kind to flourish, they 
realise that one has missed out. There are no gifts left for Man—the naked creature whose 
needs ‘are more difficult to satisfy that the rest’ (Malouf, Happy Life 28). There is nothing for 
it but to steal from the gods their powers of invention and imagination, so that humans can 
shape their own environment. As Malouf comments, ‘this version of the creation myth sets 
Man in a heroic light. . . . He is to be the self-sufficient custodian and creator of his own 
nature, his own history and fate’ (Malouf, Happy Life 30). 
 
Malouf’s own take on happiness also starts from this point: the fate of the vulnerable and 
needy human body. In our own times, this body has become a ‘good place.’ We no longer feel 
guilty about it, or associate it with sin or shame. As the twentieth century progressed, (most) 
people living in the developed world have had their material needs met by prosperity and 
abundance, and advances in medical science have seen an end to hazards such as death in 
childbirth and the ravages of disease. Care of the body is now a pleasurable, aesthetic 
practice.  
 
Malouf illustrates this by discussing two portraits depicting scenes of private, domestic life. 
These portraits play with the same ideas of what can be seen and not-seen and not-heard that 
Brisbane’s ‘unsealable’ suburban houses evoke. The first, by Rubens, depicts his young wife 
Helena Fourment in a ‘corridor moment,’ covering her nakedness in a thick fur wrap. This 
voluptuous beauty coolly regards the painter and the viewer. Her gaze is intimate, as is the 
connection with the painter. He is not in the picture, but his presence is signified by the 
texture of the brushstrokes that give life to her flesh. The second portrait, by Rembrandt, 
shows the painter and his young wife got up as the prodigal son and a whore. The artist is 
smiling, his eyes glinting as he raises a glass, while his wife looks at us knowingly from her 
perch on his lap. 
 
Privacy is a key trope in Malouf’s account of happiness. These portraits mark a beginning to a 
modern appreciation of domesticity, and detail the interior spaces designed to create a space 
for intimacy. In our own times, the appeal of this space, and the impulse to withdraw to it, 
arises from a need to retreat from an increasingly incomprehensible world, a world where 
forces like ‘the economy’ bear down and threaten our sense of security. Malouf does not 
explicitly address how such privacy should be protected, though his extended discussion of 
Jefferson’s formulation of ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ provides an opportunity 
to think on this. His recreation of how Jefferson’s ‘surge of rhetoric’ overpowered a simpler, 
narrower and more useful idea returns us to the question of public language and feeling. 
 
Malouf begins with a vivid image of Jefferson at his desk, working on his draft declaration, 
drawing on the resources of Enlightenment and classical thought—‘the harmonizing 
sentiments of the day’—and having at hand George Mason’s preamble to the Virginian 
Constitution. Jefferson’s seven words distil Mason’s more discursive statement: ‘All men are 
created equally free and independent and have certain inherent and natural rights . . . among 
which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
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property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety’ (Malouf, Happy Life 17). By 
dispensing with the terms ‘property’ and ‘safety,’ and elevating ‘happiness’ to an equal 
prominence with ‘life’ and ‘liberty,’ Malouf argues, Jefferson set a time bomb ticking. The 
kind of guarantee implicit in Mason’s document is limited, because it defines happiness 
narrowly, as subject to accident and contingency. But Jefferson’s omission of ‘property’ and 
‘safety’—words that invoke an external, material context—realigns the meaning of 
‘happiness,’ connecting it to the ‘inner world of feeling’ (Malouf, Happy Life 19). Malouf 
gives us the scene of Jefferson with his pen to suggest that, in this case, his rhetorical flourish 
dislodged political judgment. The formulation is ‘a language act rather than a considered 
political one’ (Malouf, Happy Life 25). 
 
The disconnected senses of happiness have drawn even further apart in the present. Malouf 
sees this mirrored in the tendency to separate the good life and the happy life: 
 
The advanced and highly managed societies we live in today tend to assume that 
the good life, which can to a large extent be provided for, is at least a step on the 
way to the happy life, in that it removes so many of the conditions that might 
work against it. But the good life and the happy life, as I suggested earlier, 
belong to separate and in some ways unconnected meanings of happy; one refers 
to material fortune, which can be objectively measured, and the other to an 
interior state that cannot. (Malouf, Happy Life 80) 
 
This distinction relies on a narrow idea of the ‘good.’ Limiting conceptions of the good life to 
material wellbeing, as Elizabeth Farrelly argues, ignores the costs of ‘Happiness as a vast 
global industry’ (Malouf, Happy Life 120). It also sidesteps the increasingly contentious issue 
of how, in pluralist societies, moral communities and their competing ideas of the good life 
can be accommodated. 
 
In the opening chapter of The Happy Life, Malouf lays out his materials much as he imagines 
Jefferson doing. And just as he focussed on Jefferson’s appropriation of Mason’s words, I 
want to highlight his discussion of Montaigne. Malouf’s attention here is directed to the 
achievement of ‘happiness of a more settled kind’—contentment, a condition that he calls ‘a 
luxury’ (Malouf, Happy Life 5). In ‘On Solitude,’ Montaigne argues that contentment is a 
condition of the soul: ‘We must reserve a room at the back of the shop, entirely ours, entirely 
free, in which to establish our true liberty and our principal retreat and solitude.’ Montaigne 
goes on: ‘Here our ordinary conversation must be between us and ourselves, and so private, 
that no outside association or communication can find a place’ (Green 91). Montaigne’s 
translator, Felicity Green, comments that his ‘quarrel is not with society as such, but only with 
its capacity to enslave us.’ Malouf contracts Montaigne’s sentence to a metaphor, ‘“the little 
back-shop” of domestic retirement’ and recasts its meaning, suggesting that this understanding 
of the good life has little traction in today’s world, with its suspicion of élites and uneasiness 
about virtue: ‘the notion of Virtue barely exists for us’ (Malouf, Happy Life 11).  
 
In emphasising the metaphor of a private, interior space, Malouf loses Montaigne’s sense of 
the meaning of ‘our true liberty’ and its connection with Virtue. Another reader of Montaigne, 
the psychoanalyst Anthony Storr, has elaborated this psychological reading. He argues that the 
capacity to be alone and to know ourselves is fundamental to human happiness: 
 
Being able to get in touch with one’s deepest thought and feelings, and 
providing time for them to regroup themselves into new formations and 
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combinations, are important aspects of the creative process, as well as a way of 
relieving tension and promoting metal health. 
 
It appears, therefore, that some development of the capacity to be alone is 
necessary if the brain is to function at its best, and if the individual is to fulfil his 
highest potential. Human beings easily become alienated from their own deepest 
needs and feelings. Learning, thinking, innovation, and maintaining contact with 
one’s own inner world are all facilitated by solitude. (Storr 28) 
 
Malouf quotes Montaigne’s powerful statement of this idea: ‘The greatest thing in the world is 
to know how to belong to yourself’ (Malouf, Happy Life 6), and like Storr, sees this in terms 
of psychological health. But Montaigne’s purpose is spiritual. The point of ‘shak[ing] off 
those violent holdfasts that engage us elsewhere and estrange us from ourselves’ (Malouf, 
Happy Life 6) is to prepare for a good death. In Montaigne’s thinking, that good death brings 
the individual to God. In this secular world, happiness has been completely disconnected from 
dying; the common understanding of a dignified death is one removed from suffering, not one 
that brings us to God. In this sense, Malouf is right: virtue has little purchase on contemporary 
thinking about the end of life, yet it surely continues to figure in thinking about the ends of 
human existence.  
 
Elizabeth Farrelly hears wistfulness in Malouf’s tone as he discusses contentment and the 
good life. She argues that the pursuit of happiness is dangerous because it distracts from what 
should be our real purpose, to make our lives mean something: 
 
I recognise that this puts me wholly out of step with popular opinion. Whereas 
the struggle to be ‘good,’ as it was once conceived, unavoidably linked the 
individual with both God (as moral origin) and other beings, happiness, seen so 
often to inhere in the perfect body or the biggest pile, prefers an entirely 
egocentric cosmology. (Malouf, Happy Life 122) 
 
In his fiction, it might be argued, some sense of ‘the spiritual’ inheres in the moment of being, 
the feeling of what happens. In this essay, though, it is elusive. Malouf ends his chapter on 
‘The Character of Happiness’ by reframing his question. Instead of asking ‘how should we 
live,’ he asks why happiness eludes us: ‘What is it in us, or in the world we have created, that 
continues to hold us back?’ (Malouf, Happy Life 14). Restlessness, materialism, and fear of 
the impersonal forces that shape our lives make up the elements of his answer. In the absence 
of the disciplines that trained the ancient Greeks and Romans in the care of the self, we have 
substituted stimulus and sensation and reduced freedom to personal choice. 
 
In this affluent world, contentment is rarely achieved. Instead, like the naked creatures that 
Prometheus and Epimetheus overlooked, we often feel we are ‘missing out,’ a feeling that is 
expressed in the pervasive discourse of choice. Around us we see the signs of frustration, of 
people not getting what they want, of the failure to be satisfied. The key to a happy life may 
be, as Adam Phillips has said, getting our appetites to ‘more or less work for us’: 
 
As we know more now than ever before about the kinds of lives it is possible to 
live—and affluence has allowed more people than ever before to think of their 
lives in terms of choices and options—we are always haunted by the myth of our 
potential, of what we might have it in ourselves to be or do. So when we are not 
thinking, like the character in Randall Jarrell’s poem, that ‘The way we miss our 
JASAL: Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature 14.2
FERRES: Malouf and the Public Conversation  
8
Guest Editors: Elaine Lindsay and Michael Griffith
lives is life’, we are grieving or regretting or resenting our failure to be ourselves 
as we imagine we could be. We share our lives with the people we have failed to 
be. (Phillips xii) 
 
In Missing Out (2013), Phillips begins with the problem of frustration and explores the 
obstacles that we put in our way to satisfaction: ‘there is no satisfaction without an initiating 
frustration’ (Phillips 167). Writing in the psychoanalytic tradition, Phillips’ subject is desire. 
This is not a subject that Malouf directly addresses in The Happy Life, but it is one that he 
takes up in his recent introduction to, and public promotion of, the Text Classics reissue of 
Kenneth Mackenzie’s 1937 novel, The Young Desire It. This novel is an example of 
Australian modernism that displays some of the same lyricism as Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man, published two decades earlier. Malouf recommends it to a new generation of 
readers as ‘a hymn to youth, to life, to sexual freedom and moral independence, written in full 
awareness . . . of the cost, both to others and oneself’ (Malouf, The Young Desire It xviii).  
 
The novel’s preface is an epigraph from Michael Paul’s The Anatomy of Failure: ‘To be free 
to choose is not enough. Though the young desire it, they cannot use that freedom, but must be 
forced into the decision of choice by good or evil circumstances which while they can 
perceive them they cannot control.’ The narrative follows fifteen-year-old Charles Fox in his 
first year at boarding school in Perth. He has come from the vast property where he lives alone 
with his mother, to an enclosed masculine world that bewilders and frightens him. At the 
school, disordered masculinity is unleashed in the boys who are provoked by Charles’s 
angelic, feminine beauty: within hours of his arrival, he is subjected to a vicious sexual 
assault. Though he is tormented by his peers, and lonely, Charles does well at school, because 
his talent is recognised by a headmaster who takes steps to encourage and protect him. His 
classics master, the young Cambridge graduate Christopher Penworth, becomes a mentor and 
friend. But like Charles, Penworth is unhappy at the school, and is not at home in this new and 
‘uncivilised’ country. His interest in the boy is at once intellectual and erotic. Though 
Mackenzie in later life saw himself as a gullible victim of practised seducers, in the novel he 
recreates both the anguish Charles feels and the teacher’s lack of self-knowledge. 
 
When the novel was reissued in 2013, the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to 
Child Sexual Abuse had just begun its work. The ‘disturbing and potentially sensational 
material’ contained in the novel resonated with the testimony of witnesses at the 
Commission’s hearings, which were widely publicised. Malouf’s introduction to the book 
calls attention to the way its narration manages ‘a perilous tension’: 
 
What interests [Mackenzie] is not what happens in the world of events but what 
happens in Charles Fox’s erotically charged sensory world, where he is 
confronted at every turn with situations for which he has no precedent. It is 
Mackenzie’s determination to stick with the interior view, and the 
bewilderments of young Charles Fox, that make The Young Desire It perhaps the 
earliest novel in Australia to deal with the inner life in a consistently modernist 
way. (Malouf, The Young Desire It x) 
 
Here again we are immersed in ‘the world of feeling,’ rather than ‘the world of events.’ 
Malouf focuses on how Mackenzie allows the reader an insight into the ‘uneasy territory’ of 
Penworth’s desire, and the conduct that the teacher himself recognises as cruel. Penworth is 
out of place, his emotional life cramped by his devotion to Reason, his passions only dimly 
understood.  
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In Absent Minds, an extended and careful account of the public appearances of twentieth-
century intellectuals, Collini suggests that recognition of their cultural authority depends on an 
intersecting set of conditions or relations. They should have achieved distinction in ‘an 
activity which is esteemed for the non-instrumental, creative, analytical or scholarly capacities 
it involves’; have access to media which reach publics other than those they have connected 
with already; and express ideas and views on topics or themes that are of concern to those 
other publics:   
 
A figure of acknowledged cultural standing who communicates with a true 
public on, let us say, the question of the meaning of life and death or on ideals of 
love and sex is neither acting as a member of a group nor ‘intervening’ in 
politics: but that figure may quite properly be described as acting in the role of 
‘an intellectual’. (Collini 62) 
 
Collini argues that conventional ideas of the intellectual’s status either as an ‘outsider’ or as a 
member of an élite political class are mistaken. For him, the key factor is influence, and the 
ability to reach a ‘true public,’ an audience beyond their original sphere of insiders and 
familiars.  
 
Malouf has found such a public through his essays, broadcasts and public appearances. His 
contributions to the public conversation remind us of the value of the arts and culture at the 
same time as they engage with the big questions of contemporary life: how we can live 
together, how individuals can flourish. These questions take him beyond an old politics of 
identity. As a writer of fiction, he brings ‘mental and imaginative capacities beyond the 
ordinary’ (Collini 54) to the public conversation. Those capacities underscore his fiction’s 
facility ‘for smuggling us into another skin and allowing us to live a new life there’ (Malouf, 
Happy Life 87), and they underwrite his cultural authority. As a public commentator, 
transferring that facility to the world of analysis and opinion, Malouf redescribes the public 
realm as a world of feeling as well as of reason. 
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